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THE ALIEN VENUE STATUTE: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
OF FEDERAL VENUE PROVISIONS AND ALIEN RIGHTS
"Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the
stranger as for one of your country."-Leviticus
24:22
A venue requirement must be satisfied each time a plaintiff
brings suit in the United States.' The purpose of this requirement is to
protect defendants from being sued in forums with which they have
insufficient connections, 2 thus basing forum choice primarily on conve-
nience. The present federal venue statute ensures this in several ways.
When jurisdiction is based on diversity, United States citizens may be
sued only in the district where all the plaintiffs or defendants reside or
where the claim arose.8 When jurisdiction is founded on grounds other.
than diversity, suit may be brought only in the district where all the
defendants reside or where the claim arose.
4
Alien defendants, however, may be sued in any district in the
United States.5 Consequently, an alien may be forced to defend a suit
wherever a plaintiff chooses to bring it, and, quite naturally, a plaintiff
will choose a forum in which the law conforms most favorably with her
claim.6 In this way the Alien Venue Statute indirectly promotes forum
shopping, so that while generally considered only a procedural device,
it has a significant, substantive impact on the outcome of litigation in-
volving alien defendants.
This note will analyze the impact of this statute on the rights of
aliens by tracing the development of the law as it has evolved through
legislative enactment and judicial decision-making.
1. R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, CIVIL PROCEDURE 163-64 (4th ed. 1978).
2. Harley v. Oliver, 400 F. Supp. 105, 108 (1975).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1976).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (1976) [hereinafter cited as the Alien Venue Statute].
Aliens, as referred to in this note, include all resident and non-resident aliens, as defined
by the Immigration and Nationality Act. See infra note 98.
6. See A. ScOrr & R. KENT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE
320 (1967). Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, an alien may request that the
case be removed to a more convenient location, although the applicable law will continue
to be that of the State where the action was originally brought. Id. See also Gulf Oil
Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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II
Several sections of the Judiciary Act of 17897 afforded alien liti-
gants protection. 8 Section 11 of the Act, with which this paper is con-
cerned, dictated the grounds upon which venue could be established.9
The framers of the Judiciary Act were influenced by the European le-
gal scholars of the time.1" The writings of Emmerich de Vattel and
William Blackstone were particularly instructive, providing guidelines
for the framers in delimiting the scope of alien rights."1 According to
Vattel, the rights of aliens while temporarily in a foreign state were
equivalent to the rights accorded citizens of that state."2 Concomi-
7. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 [hereinafter cited as the Judiciary Act].
8. Id. § 9. Alien plaintiffs were given the right to bring an action "for a tort only
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Section 11 of the
Judiciary Act stated that the circuit courts had original jurisdiction over civil suits where
an alien was a party.
And be it further enacted, That the circuit courts shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity,
where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States
are plaintiffs or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is
between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a
citizen of another State.
Id.
9. Id. § 11.
But no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in an-
other, in any civil action before a Circuit or District Court and
no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against an inhabitant of the United States, by any other dis-
trict than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he
shall be found at the time of serving the writ ....
Id.
10. S. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 23 (1970). Padover's study of the
men who framed the Constitution includes an analysis of their heritage and its effect on
the document. As these are the same men who later wrote the Judiciary Act, see infra
note 25, his analysis holds good with reference to that document as well. He said that:
The delegates shared a common culture outlook. Their ethnic
roots were British (including Northern Irish), their religious
background was Protestant, and the education they received
was based on the classics .... In the field of legal ideas and
political theory, about half-a-dozen writers had the deepest in-
fluence. These were Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), Henry
Homes (Lord Kames: 1696-1782) and Sir William Blackstone
(1723'1780) in the field of law ....
Id. The writings of Emmerich de Vattel were also of great importance to the Framers. Id.
at 129.
11. See infra text accompanying note 25.




tantly, aliens were subject to the laws of the host countries in which
they were residing. 3 Vattel relied on treatises of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries to reach these conclusions.'
Blackstone found that aliens possessed legal rights, although he
did not think that these rights were as extensive as Vattel had as-
serted.'6 Under the laws of England, aliens had the power to draft
wills, bring actions against native-born Englishmen, and acquire goods,
money and personal estates of a transitory nature."8 Blackstone enun-
ciated four legal limitations on the activities of aliens. The first was
that a foreigner was prohibited from purchasing real property. 17 The
three other limitations discussed by Blackstone were offenses violative
of both English law and the law of nations.'8 Provisions addressing
13. Id. at 189.
14. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace, Sept. 20, 1697, France-The Netherlands, 21
Parry's T.S. 347. An English translation of article XII may be found in F. RUDDY, supra
note 12, at 188, which provides:
The ordinary course of justice shall be free and open on both
sides, and the subjects both on one or the other dominion may
pursue their rights, suits and pretensions, according to the
laws and statutes of each country; and then without any dis-
tinctions, obtain all the satisfaction that is justly due them
Id. See also Treaty of Peace and Friendship, July 13, 1713, Great Britain-Spain, 28
Parry's T.S. 295. Article VII provides:
That the ordinary distribution of justice be restored and open
again through the Kingdoms and dominions of each of their
Royal Majesties; so that it be free for all subjects on both sides
to prosecute and obtain their rights, pretensions and actions;
to the laws, constitutions and statutes of each kingdom ....
Id.
15. I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
16. Id. at *360.
17. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at *274.
18. Id. According to Blackstone there were three offenses against the law of na-
tions, cognizable under English law, upon which aliens could bring suit. 4 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *68-73. The first offense of which he spoke was the violation of the
doctrine of safe-conduct. He said:
[D]uring the continuance of any safe-conduct, either express
or implied, the foreigner is under the protection of the King
and the law; and, more especially, as it is one of the articles of
magna carta (9 Hen. III, c. 30) that foreign merchants shall be
entitled to safe-conduct and security throughout the kingdom;
there is no question but that any violation of either the person
or property of such foreigner may be punished by indictment
in the name of the King ....
Id. at 069. The doctrine of safe-conduct as interpreted in Tirlot v. Morris, 80 Eng. Rep.
828 (1611), was found to apply to a range of actions brought by foreign merchants. Tirlot
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these offenses were later incorporated into article III of the United
States Constitution 9 and permeated the drafts of the Judiciary Act of
1789.20
James Madison, particularly aware of the importance of address-
ing the issue of the federal judiciary's power to adjudicate conflicts
that involved aliens, proposed that article III read:
[T]he jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall
be to hear and determine in the first instance and
of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in
the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the
high seas, captures from an enemy, cases in which
foreigners or citizens of other States applying to
such jurisdiction may be interested ... .
Although the specific language offered was not included in the final
version of article 111,2 concern with jurisdiction over foreigners re-
mained. Madison reiterated this concern in The Federalist23 when he
wrote, "the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all causes in
involved an action brought by an alien for libel. The court found the suit to be actiona-
ble in England, stating: "As to merchant strangers by the laws of this realm, they are
well enabled for to have personal actions here, but not real action." Id. at 834.
A number of years later, the court had the opportunity to interpret the phrase
"personal actions" in Pisani v. Lawson, 133 Eng. Rep. 35 (1839). Here the court held that
"an alien friend might well maintain all actions personal, such as assault and battery."
Id. at 37. The second offense violative of the law of nations was the infringement of the
rights of ambassadors. See generally 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69-70.
The final wrong was piracy. Piracy, according to Blackstone, "is an offense against
a universal law of society; a pirate being, according to Sir Edward Coke, hostis humani
generis." Accordingly, "every community hath a right, by the rule of self-defense, to
inflict punishment upon him ..... Id. at *71. The concept of hostis humani generis
was recently invoked by Judge Kaufman in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d. 876, 890
(2d Cir. 1980). Judge Kaufman stated that "the torturer has become-like the pirate and
slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Id.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
20. The Judiciary Act, supra note 7.
21. M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTON 22 (rev. ed. 1937).
22. Article III, section 2 now reads:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority . . . to Controversies between . . .Citizens of
different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under the Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
23. THE FEDERALIST (P. Ford ed. 1898).
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which the citizens of other countries are concerned.
24
By the time the Framers of the Constitution sought to establish a
judicial code the legal theories espoused by Vattel and Blackstone were
entrenched in American political thought.25 The Judiciary Act of 1789
attempted to affirmatively establish the rights of aliens under the fed-
eral judicial system.2 Prior to the Act of 1789 aliens were subject to
the venue rules that applied to citizens.
Section 11 of the Act was first applied in Piquet v. Swan,2 7 and
was originally construed so as to continue to grant alien defendants the
same rights as native-born defendants.28 This conclusion was reached
by interpreting the word "inhabitant" in the statute to include both
aliens and citizens. As Justice Story held:
I lay no particular stress upon the word "inhabi-
tant" and deem it a mere equivalent description
of "citizen" and "alien" in the general clause con-
ferring jurisdiction over parties. A person might
be an inhabitant without being a citizen; and a
citizen might not be an inhabitant, though he re-
tained his citizenship.2"
Justice Story's reading of the Act was disputed and eventually repudi-
ated by both legal scholars and the judiciary."'
III
In 1875 Congress revised section 11 of Judiciary Act of 1789 by
24. Id. at 532-33. In further explanation Madison stated that: "A distinction may
perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the law of nations and
those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may
be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the States." Id.
25. S. PADOVER, supra note 10, at 129. Many of the delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention participated in the drafting of the Judiciary Act of 1789. They in-
cluded Oliver Ellsworth, delgate from Connecticut, and William Patterson, delegate from
New Jersey. Id. See Warren, infra note 55, at 50. He states:
[T]he original Draft Bill is in several different handwritings.
Section 1 to 9 inclusive are in the handwriting of William Pat-
terson; Sections 10 to 23 are, in all probability, in the hand-
writing of Oliver Ellsworth; Section 24 is in the handwriting of
Caleb Strong; and the succeeding sections are written by a re-
cording clerk.
Id.
26. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text.
27. 19 F. Cas. 609 (D. Mass. 1828).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 613.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 31-60.
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replacing the phrase "against any inhabitant"'" with the words
"against any person" so that the text now read: "No civil suit shall be
brought before either of said courts against any person in any other
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant or in which he shall be
found. .... ,,32 The next change in wording occurred in 1887 when Con-
gress deleted the language "where he shall be found" from the stat-
ute.88 The Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., " inter-
preted these changes as signalling the beginning of the retreat from
affording aliens the same protection as citizens under the federal venue
law.
The Shaw case involved a Michigan corporation, sued in the
Southern District of New York.35 The defendant, Quincy Mining Com-
pany, claimed that venue in New York was improper, because the cor-
poration was incorporated in, and thus was an inhabitant of, the West-
ern District of Michigan.86 The company therefore alleged that it could
only be sued in Michigan, the district of which it was an inhabitant.
7
The Court held that a corporation had but one residence, the State in
which it was incorporated, 8 and that based on the Act of March 3,
188719 where jurisdiction was founded on diversity, a suit could only be
brought in the district where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants
reside.4 0 Thus the Court held that the Circuit Court of New York had
no jurisdiction.'
1
In the course of its analysis, the Court found that the word "in-
habitant," as used in the venue statute, had no larger meaning than
31. The Judiciary Act, supra note 7, § 11.
32. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
33. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, amended by Act of Aug. 13,
1888, ch. 866, §§ 1, 6, 25 Stat. 433, 436. The Act reads:
No civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts
against any person or by any original process or proceeding in
any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but
where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the ac-
tion is between citizens of different States, suit shall be
brought only in the district of residence of either the plaintiff
or the defendant.
Id.
34. 145 U.S. 444 (1891).
35. Id. at 453.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 450-53.
38. Id.
39. See supra note 33.
40. 145 U.S. 444. The plaintiff was a citizen of Massachusetts. Id.
41. Id. at 453.
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"citizen.""" The Court then qualified this finding by stating that their
interpretation of the venue statute was precedentially limited to diver-
sity cases and that this "case does not present the question what may
be the rule in suits against an alien or foreign corporation, which may
be governed by different considerations."""
By construing the terms "citizens," "inhabitants" and "residents"
as they did, the Court unwittingly created the dilemma that surfaced
in 1893 in In re Hohorst." Hohorst involved an allegation of patent
infringement. A suit was brought against the Hamburg-American
Packet Company, a company incorporated under the laws of Ger-
many."" Relying upon the residence criteria established in Shaw, the
company claimed that it was incorporated abroad, that it had no resi-
dence in the United States, and thus could not be sued in this coun-
try."O In order to give plaintiffs a remedy, the Court was forced to con-
clude that the venue statute was completely inapplicable to aliens.4 7 In
the Court's words, to hold otherwise "would leave the Courts of the
United States open to aliens against citizens and close them to citizens
against aliens." The Court held that aliens had been outside the
venue provision prior to 1875 and were not brought within it by the
Act of 1888."'
The Court used a two-step analysis to reach its decision. First, in
reviewing the legislative history on the scope of federal venue, the
Court concluded that the Act of 187610 did not include aliens, and that
the change in wording, as adopted by the Act, was not a substantive
change."' After deciding that, historically, aliens had been excluded
42. Id. at 447. The Court found that
"inhabitant" in [the] act, was apparently used, not in any
larger meaning than "citizen," but to avoid the incongruity of
speaking of a citizen of anything less than a State, when the
intention was to cover not only a district which included a
whole State, but also two districts in one State, like the dis-
tricts of Maine and Massachusetts in the State of Massachu-
setts, and the districts of Virginia and Kentucky in the State
of Virginia, established by § 2 of the same act.
Id.
43. Id. at 453.
44. 150 U.S. 653 (1893).
45. Id. at 654.
46. Id. at 657.
47. Id. at 653.
48. Id. at 660.
49. See supra note 33.
50. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
51. 150 U.S. at 661. The Court stated that, "the substitution, in the act of March
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, of the words 'against any person' with 'against an inhabitant of the
1982]
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from the statute, the Court discussed the question of whether they
might currently be included and found that since the statute was
framed with reference to the defendant's place of residence, aliens
could not possibly be included since by definition an alien was a resi-
dent of no district. The Court reasoned that when Congress eliminated
the provision authorizing suits wherever the defendant could be
found, 52 federal question cases were only brought in districts where the
defendant was an inhabitant."5 It was therefore necessary for aliens to
either satisfy the residence requirement, which they could not do based
on Shaw, or to find that they were outside of the venue statute. By
finding that aliens were outside the venue statute, the Court left them
vulnerable to suit "in any district in which valid service can be made
upon the defendant."'
' 4
While the judicial trend of exclusion of aliens from the venue
statute was developing in the courts, the same conclusions were
reached by Charles Warren in his 1923 treatise on the Judiciary Act.
5 5
At that time Warren uncovered the original draft bill of the Act and
used it as the basis for reinterpreting numerous sections of the bill.
According to Warren, there were two preliminary drafts of section 11
prior to the final writing." Warren interpreted the changes in language
from the draft bill to the final version as signifying an elimination of
foreigners and foreign corporations from the federal venue statute.
5 7
By so doing, Warren was bound to conclude that alien defendants were
wholly outside of the Judiciary Act for venue purposes. Thus, as there
were no alternative statutory provisions from which alien defendants
United States,' has been assumed to be an immaterial change." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The Court also noted that diversity jurisdiction, which would have al-
lowed the suit to have been brought where either the plaintiff or the defendant resided,
was not germane to suits against aliens on the grounds that true diversity with an alien
as a party could never exist. Id. at 660.
54. Id. at 662. Had the Court had the foresight, it might at this time have distin-
guished between resident and non-resident aliens, granting the former protection under
the venue statute and only excluding the latter.
55. Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARv. L. RE v. 49, 80-81 (1923).
56. Id. The first draft in part read: "[N]o person shall be arrested for trial in any
... other Circuit Court or District Court than that within which the arrest shall be
made." Id. The second draft read: "[N]o person shall be brought to trial in any cause in
any other district than that where the defendant is an inhabitant or in which he shall be
found at the time of serving the writ." Id. For the final draft of the bill, see supra note 9.
57. Id. Warren reached this conclusion by assuming that the change from the




could derive venue protection, they could be sued in any district."
Warren's view was adopted by the courts and by the legal scholars of
the day, and became the dominant judicial interpretation."
Statutory legitimacy was given to the Court's holding in In re
Hohorst as well as to Warren's scholarly analysis in 1945 when Con-
gress enacted the Alien Venue Statute. 0 Present day case law confirms
the exclusion of alien defendants from all other venue provisions, both
general and special.'*
IV
The men whose ideas shaped the concepts promulgated by the
Judiciary Act of 1789 started with a common notion, that an alien was
to be accorded legal rights and liabilities substantially equivalent to
those of a citizen." This premise was established by both English and
European legal tradition, and adopted by this country at its birth.3
This legal heritage was acknowledged by Justice Story when he first
interpreted the Judiciary Act and found aliens to be within its venue
confines. "4 By interpreting the Act as he did, Justice Story credited the
framers with the wisdom of including all venue situations, those involv-
ing aliens and citizens alike, within the ambit of the bill. Only by disre-
garding the roots from which this Act grew, could the conclusion be
reached that alien defendants were omitted from the venue provisions,
either intentionally or through oversight.
The Warren interpretation, coupled with the decisions of Shaw
and Hohorst, solidified a notion contrary to the intentions of the au-
thors of the Act. Warren's analysis of section 11, the venue provision,
concentrates on the first use of the word "inhabitants" in that section;
the Shaw Court took umbrage with the second use of "inhabitants" in
that same section." Yet both Warren and the Court reached the same
58. Section 11 of the Judiciary Act is the only portion of the bill to deal with
venue. By concluding that aliens were unprovided for in that section of the bill, Warren
necessarily had to reach the conclusion that there were no statutory limitations on where
an alien could be sued.
59. See Brunette Machine Works v. Kockum, Inc., 406 U.S. 706 (1972).
60. 62 Stat. 935, ch. 646, June 25, 1948.
61. See Brunette, 406 U.S. at 714. "1391(d) is properly regarded, not as a venue
restriction at all, but rather as a declaration of the long-established rule that suits
against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the federal venue laws, general and
special." Id.
62. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
65. See Shaw, 145 U.S. at 449; Warren, supra note 55, at 80-81.
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conclusion, namely, that aliens are excluded from the venue
provisions.ee
The errors of both stem from the same misconception. Quite sim-
ply, if the framers had changed the first use of "inhabitant" to "citi-
zen," they would have excluded aliens from the rule and left no ambi-
guity in the law. There would have then been no need to use the word
"citizen" instead of "inhabitant," the second time "inhabitant" ap-
pears in the text. This formulation alleviates the problem foreseen by
the Shaw Court, namely that of speaking of a person as a citizen of less
than a state. Only by leaving the words as they did, were the framers
able to include both aliens and citizens within the venue provisions
without resort to tedious verbiage and supererogatory explanations.
V
As a result of the semantic misinterpretations that shaped alien
venue, we are heirs to a statute that poses constitutional problems in
its failure to protect aliens. The constitutional adequacy of federal
statutess7 that rely on alienage distinctions has been analyzed by the
Supreme Court under a due process and equal protection rubric." The
Court's inquiry has focused on the immigration and foreign affairs is-
sues evoked by these statutes on the one hand and on the deprivations
to alien liberties that they engender on the other hand. 9
In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,70 the Court confronted these
conflicting interests in the area of public employment of aliens.7 The
Civil Service Commission (CSC) had enacted a regulation which pro-
66. See Shaw, 145 U.S. at 449; Warren, supra note 55, at 81.
67. As the Court noted in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1975), "the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on state power are not directly applicable to the
Federal Government .. . because Congress and the President have broad power over
immigration and naturalization which the States do not possess." Id. at 95.
68. Id. at 103. A due process analysis was applied in Hampton. The Court found
that- "[Wlhen the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justifi-
cation for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause if
adopted by a State, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for presuming
that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest." Id.
69. Id. at 104, 116.
70. 426 U.S. 88 (1975).
71. Id. The case involved five alien Chinese residents, lawfully and permanently
residing in the United States, who had been denied federal employment because of their
alienage. They had either begun work and had been terminated when it was realized that
the citizenship requirement was unfulfilled, or they were not even allowed to compete for




hibited the employment of resident aliens in the federal civil service."
The CSC claimed that the regulation served several functions.7" The
Court found that only one of these functions was of legitimate concern
to the Commission, that of having "one simple rule excluding all non-
citizens when it is manifest that citizenship is an appropriate and legit-
imate requirement for some important and sensitive positions.174 Yet,
when balanced against the deprivations endured by aliens seeking em-
ployment, the Court found that there was inadequate justification for
the Commission's guidelines.7' The Court did state, however, that
should Congress or the President choose to determine that all non-citi-
zens were ineligible for federal jobs on "national interest" grounds,
they would have the right to do so. Thus, while vindicating the rights
of aliens vis-a-vis federal agencies, alien rights remained subordinate to
congressional and executive concerns.
While the Court in Hampton established that a due process test
would be applied when federal regulations conflicted with the rights of
aliens,7 the Court in Mathews applied an equal protection analysis,
with presumptive validity extended to the legislation examined.78 The
Court's deference to Congress rested on the conclusion that alienage
classifications were within the general naturalization arena and were
thus particularly suitable to legislative rather than judicial determina-
72. 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976). This regulation restricts admission to the qualify-
ing examination to citizens or persons who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States. Under this provision, a non-citizen may be entitled to a limited executive assign-
ment in the absence of qualified citizens or in other rare circumstances. Id.
73. 426 U.S. at 104. They claimed that "the broad exclusion may facilitate the
President's negotiation of treaties with foregin powers" or that it might serve as "an
appropriate incentive to aliens to qualify for naturalization." Id.
74. Id. at 115.
75. 426 U.S. at 116.
The impact of the [Civil Service Commission's] rule on the
millions of lawfully admitted resident aliens is precisely the
same as the aggregate impact of comparable state rules which
were invalidated by our decision in Sugarman [Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 633 (1973)]. By broadly denying this class
substantial opportunities for employment, the Civil Service
Commission rule deprives its members of an aspect of liberty.
Id.
76. Id. at 116. The Court stated that "assuming without deciding that the na-
tional interests identified by the petitioners would adequately support an explicit deter-
mination by Congress or the President to exclude all non-citizens from the federal ser-
vice, we conclude that those interests cannot provide an acceptable rationalization for
such a determination by the Civil Service Commission." Id.
77. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 116-17.
78. 426 U.S. at 67.
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tion and administration. 9
In Mathews, the Court adjudged the validity of section 1831 of
the Social Security Act of 1935.80 Under the Social Security Act in or-
der to be eligible for participation in the Medicare program, an alien
had to have been admitted to the United States for permanent resi-
dence and to have resided in the United States for at least five years.81
Justice Stevens, writing for a unanimous Court, first examined the fed-
eral interest implicated in the legislation. He found that Congress had
broad power over aliens due to legitimate congressional concern in the
areas of immigration and naturalization. 2 He further found that the
federal government could discriminate between citizens and aliens,83 as
well as among various sub-categories of aliens.8" Consequently, the
Court held that "[t]he fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differ-
ently from citizens does not in itself imply that such disparate treat-
ment is 'invidious.' "85
With this in mind, the Court turned to the standard to be used in
evaluating the Medicare legislation. It found that a "narrow standard
of review""8 was required because the Court was delving into an area
that fell within the overlay of judicial and congressional authority.87 In
examining the Act, the Court found Congress' goal legitimate and only
minimally scrutinized Congress' means.8 Turning next to the question
of aliens' rights, the Court accepted the power of Congress to bestow
greater benefits on those aliens who had resided in this country for a
longer period of time than upon those aliens who had recently arrived
79. Id. at 79-80.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o) (1976 & Supp. IV 1974).
81. The statutory provision at issue was the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395(o)(2)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 1395(o)(2)(B) (1976 &
Supp. II 1972).
82. 426 U.S. at 79-80. "In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens .... The fact that an Act of Congress treats aliens differently from citizens
does not in itself imply that such disparate treatment is 'invidious.'" Id.
83. Id. at 78. "[A] legitimate distinction between citizens and aliens may justify
attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the other." Id.
84. Id. at 78-79. Justice Stevens relied on the classification scheme established
by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163, as amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1101
(1970 and Supp. IV 1974). The Act begins by dividing alien-immigrants from alien-visi-
tors or non-immigrants, and then further subdivides these categories. 426 U.S. at 79 n.13.
85. 426 U.S. at 80.
86. Id. at 82.
87. Id. at 81.
88. Id. at 83. The Court said: "Since neither requirement is wholly irrational,
this case essentially involves nothing more than a claim that it would have been more
reasonable for Congress to select somewhat different requirements of the same kind." Id.
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here. The Court took notice of the congressional determination that
those aliens who had lived in the United States for several years would
have more extensive ties to this country.
s9
The precedents established in the Hampton and Mathews deci-
sions aid in structuring an equal protection claim that the Alien Venue
Statute is unconstitutional. The Hampton decision, although it does
grant certain rights to aliens, limits those rights to claims against ad-
ministrative agencies and not Congress.'" Because the Alien Venue
Statute was enacted by Congress, it is doubtful that Hampton will be
of substantial precedential value to the litigant. Mathews, on the other
hand, limits aliens' rights by establishing two criteria. First, it looks at
the ties an alien has to the country and then it examines the congres-
sional interest involved.' 1 Beginning with the premise that aliens may
constitutionally be distinguished from citizens, the basis by which this
may be done must be established. In Mathews, the Court suggests that
"Congress may decide that as the alien's tie [to the United States]
grows stronger, so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of
munificence."' This standard makes both logical and practical sense,
if it is assumed that the longer an alien remains in the United States
the greater his contribution will be. As the length of his stay increases,
so does his right to partake of this nation's assets.
One of these assets is our judicial system and the protections it
affords litigants. Under the venue provisions93 litigants are assured
that they will not be forced into an inconvenient forum." The ration-
ale behind this is that people reside in one place, that they spend most
of their time in the district in which they reside, and therefore, the
most convenient forum will usually be that district.9" The assumption
that is made regarding aliens is that they do not reside in one place,
hence one district will be as convenient as another.
89. Id. at 83.
90. See supra notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text.
91. 426 U.S. at 78-80. This is an intermediate level of scrutiny under an equal
protection analysis. Id.
92. Id. at 80.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) & (b).
94. See, e.g., Penrod Drilling Co. v. Johnson, 414 F.2d 1217, 1221-22 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1969). "Venue is primarily a question of convenience for
litigants and witnesses ... and venue provisions should be treated in practical terms."
Id. Accord Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). This Court states
that "venue is to protect the defendant against the risk that a plaintiff will select an
unfair or inconvenient place of trial." Id. at 184.
95. See Finger v. Materson, 152 F. Supp. 224, 225 (1954). The court stated that
"residence does not arise out of a transitory abode or out of a temporary sojourn in a
place other than that of residence or domicile." Id. at 225.
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The fallacy inherent in this reasoning is readily illustrated by the
very definitions embodied in the Immigration and Nationality Act."
The Act begins by defining an alien as "any person not a citizen or
national of the United States."' A sub-group of aliens, the "immi-
grant," is defined by the Act in terms of intent."8 Those aliens who
maintain residences in foreign countries without the intent to abandon
them are considered to be non-immigrants." Those persons who are
classified as immigrants have evidenced an intent to remain in the
United States. 100 It logically follows that if an intent to remain is pre-
sent, a residence will be established. Moreover, since the concept of
intent is a prerequisite for status as an immigrant, not only will resi-
dence be established, but the requirements for domicile will be met.'01
Once it is officially recognized that immigrants maintain residences
and are not amorphously floating across the country, it should also fol-
low that they will be as inconvenienced as any citizen forced to defend
suit in a foreign state.10'
While numerous sub-groups of aliens may not possess a single
place of residence, to legislate on the assumption that no alien resides
96. 8 U.s.c. § 1101(3).
97. Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163.
98. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101, immigrants
would include grown unmarried children of citizens; spouses and grown unmarried chil-
dren of aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence; grown married children of citi-
zens; brothers and sisters of citizens; certain victims of persecution and catastrophic nat-
ural calamities who were granted conditional entry and remained in the United States at
least two years; and children and spouses of citizens and parents of citizens at least 21
years old.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (15). "Residence" is defined as "the place of general abode;
the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact,
without regard to intent." Id. at (33). A "resident alien" is any non-citizen "lawfully
admitted for permanent residence" in accordance with the immigration laws of the
United States. Id. § 1101(a)(20).
100. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
101. J. STORY, CoNFUcr OF LAws 45 (1834). "If a person has actually removed to
another place, with the definite intention of remaining there for an indefinite time, and
as a place of fixed present domicile, it is deemed his place of domicile, notwithstanding
he may entertain a floating intention to return at some future period." Id.
102. Rosbery, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75
MICH. L. Rv. 1092, 1103 (1977):
Resident aliens have the same stake as citizens in the long-
range welfare of the communities in which they live. They
may, to be sure, move from one community to another, and
some will return to their country of origin. But citizens also
move, and I know of no reason to believe that resident aliens
have a higher rate of mobility than other persons.
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in one place is to grossly over-generalize from the circumstances of a
few. As the Court stated in Mathews, "[t]he class of aliens is itself a
heterogenous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties
to this country.""1 8 Thus, it would appear to be a legitimate exercise of
congressional or judicial power to allow some aliens, immigrants per-
haps, protection under those sections of the venue statute that are cur-
rently applicable only to citizens.
In the second part of the test established by Mathews, the ques-
tion becomes, what are the congressional interests in retaining this
statute, and do they outweigh the interests of alien residents? Unlike
the benefits bestowed by Medicare,'" there is no monetary burden at-
tached to granting aliens the right to defend suits in the district within
which they reside. Burdening the courts with additional cases is also
not a legitimate concern, as a revision of the statute would not in-
crease, but only reallocate, the present case load.105 Nor does this stat-
ute involve a fundamental governmental interest that would justify the
exclusion of aliens from the courts in the states in which they live. The
statute does not seek to deprive aliens of access to the courts per se. It
only dilutes their power to effectively litigate, by creating a situation in
which increased expenditures of time and money will necessarily be
mandated, due to the additional expenses incurred in defending a suit
in a remote district or state.
CONCLUSION
The Alien Venue Statute is unsound in conception and prejudi-
cial in application. This statute, unlike numerous other statutes that
restrict the rights of aliens,'" is supported by neither a significant gov-
103. 426 U.S. at 78-79.
104. Id. at 82-83. Although the Court found that the "five-year line drawn by
Congress [was] longer than necessary to protect the fiscal integrity of the program," the
Court found that some residence requirements would be legitimate in order to insure
payment of taxes by aliens prior to their receiving monetary benefits from the govern-
ment. Id.
105. Again, this differs from the issue in Mathews, where there would be a tre-
mendous increase in the number of Medicare patients, had the Court struck down the
five-year rule. See 426 U.S. at 81 n.20. The Court also pointed out that- "An unlikely,
but possible consequence of holding that appellees are constitutionally entitled to wel-
fare benefits would be a further extension of similar benefits to over 440,000 Cuban pa-
rolees." Id.
106. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 931 (1976 & Supp. IV) (income tax benefits and deduc-
tions for citizens); 46 U.S.C. § 1171(a) (1976) (applications for govenment subsidy for
shipping operations involving foreign trade are granted to citizens only).
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ernmental interest in foreign affairs nor by a legitimate concern with
federal fiscal expenditures.' 7
To narrow or abolish this statute would not deprive citizens of
their constitutional rights or limit any of the expectations that attach
to United States citizenship. Certainly, the loss of the strategic proce-
dural advantage presently held by citizens would fail to amount to the
denial of a fundamental right or interest if the statute were to be
repealed.
Yet the burden upon alien-defendants is oppressive. The infer-
ence is that an alien is without a residence. This official statement of
inferiority serves to stigmatize the alien in the eyes of the community
and to perpetuate an unfortunate myth. The statute also promotes fo-
rum-shopping by allowing plaintiffs to scan the laws of each and every
district in the nation in search of that rule of law that conforms most
favorably with their claim. The statute further disadvantages alien-liti-
gants by forcing them to defend suit in a district that may be several
hundred miles from where they reside and with which they have no
connection.
Regardless of the level of scrutiny the Court may choose to apply,
the disparate treatment afforded aliens can be justified by neither an
equal protection nor a due process analysis.10 ' By failing to take cogni-
zance of the legal-historical context in which the rights of aliens were
initially circumscribed, the Judiciary and the Congress have needlessly
shackled the liberties of aliens residing in this country.
Hilary Jane Leff
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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